The Premier League’s statement set it out with unusual precision: “A total of £830.69m, payable and paid by Abu Dhabi United Group (ADUG) to the club.” In short, Manchester City’s owners were found to have circumvented the league’s financial regulations by pumping money into the club. The judgement arrived less than five days after Manchester United’s extended filing to the New York Stock Exchange, which set out their year-end accounts to 30 June 2026.
Inside that filing was an interest payment of £37m, up from £34m a year earlier. The football finance blogger Swiss Ramble now estimates that United’s net interest payments since the leveraged Glazer takeover in 2005 have reached £852m in total. Without excusing City’s owners in any way, many supporters of both Manchester clubs have noted the symmetry: at one club an ownership group has ploughed money in, while at the other a comparable sum has been taken out.
United’s latest accounts carried a comment from chief executive Omar Berrada: “While these results confirm that we are on the right trajectory, we will continue to take a disciplined approach to ensure our finances remain sustainable.” That followed a third-place Premier League finish, which confirmed a return to the Champions League after a two-year absence. Record revenues of £677.6m, projected to rise as high as £760m in 2026-27, are something to celebrate — but Berrada’s cautious tone underlined a few home truths.
The club confirmed they had spent £191.7m on new players and associated costs since 30 June — notably Carlos Baleba, Andrey Santos and Youri Tielemans, plus academy additions such as England youth international Tynan Thompson — with payments due over the next five years. United also revealed they had borrowed an additional £90m, taking their overall debt to £1.15bn. For context, the comparable figure in the accounts to June 2021 was £667m. Before 30 June, United’s transfer debt stood at £375m, of which £218m must be paid before 30 June 2027. The club added that, on top of Baleba, Santos and Tielemans, it is liable for a further £122.8m in potential contract payments should players already signed hit pre-agreed targets.
When United restructured their debt in June they added $125m (£94.36m) to their main debt. On 23 September they said £63.5m had been spent on land for their proposed new stadium, the precise funding model for which is still to be determined. Many fans, particularly those who do not want a new stadium, feel that money would have been better invested in Michael Carrick’s squad — a view the club’s stated “disciplined approach” does not share. Supporters held their latest protest against the ownership before the home defeat by Manchester City on 13 September.
On wages, United had the fifth highest bill in the Premier League in 2025 at £313m. The absence of European football meant that fell to £302m in 2025-26; no other clubs have released their figures yet, but it would be a major surprise if United climbed any higher, meaning Carrick over-achieved by finishing third. United’s wages-to-turnover ratio is 45%, a figure no club bettered last season. While there are variables and notable exceptions — including United themselves, who over the past decade have topped the annual salary cost table without winning the Premier League, and finished 15th in 2024-25 despite those fifth highest wage costs — there is a general correlation between salaries and performance.
United were relatively restrained on transfer spending this summer, with a £148m outlay below that of newly-promoted Ipswich and Hull among others. Their recent net spend has nevertheless been high, and the reason is clear. When the most recent window closed on 1 September they had generated £47m from sales, ranking 11th in the Premier League; only Liverpool of their ‘big six’ rivals brought in less. Since selling Romelu Lukaku to Inter Milan for £74m in 2019, United have generated more than £25m for a player on only four occasions — for Mason Greenwood, Scott McTominay, Rasmus Hojlund and Alejandro Garnacho. This summer a series of young players departed, some for lower fees than anticipated, such as Radek Vitek and Toby Collyer, who joined Middlesbrough and West Brom respectively, and others for nothing, like defenders Tyler Fredricson and James Overy. In every case the transfers included significant sell-on and buy-back clauses, part of a strategy to generate more revenue from player sales; Vitek’s move to Middlesbrough could eventually net United £14m.
In June 2023, Premier League clubs voted to cap future leveraged buyouts at around 65% of a club’s value, a move that appeared to respond to ALK Capital’s takeover of Burnley in December 2020. Many United fans feel that change came 18 years too late.
With little realistic chance of the substantive debt being paid off, Berrada and his colleagues must navigate a tricky balance: keeping costs under control, trimming outstanding transfer fees, avoiding extending the revolving credit limit and funding a new stadium — all while spending enough to deliver on the pitch. The commercial stakes are clear. In 2017-18, United earned £80m in prize money from reaching the Champions League quarter-finals; in 2024-25, they received £31m for reaching the Europa League final. Under their recently negotiated shirt deal with Adidas, a £10m annual reduction applies if the club miss out on Champions League qualification.
When Carrick sends his team out against bottom-club Tottenham at Old Trafford on 10 October, they will be attempting to climb from 12th place in the table. The overall target is undefined, but it is clear that Champions League qualification will form a significant part of it.